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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
JOAN B ..MOORE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COl\IP ANY OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellant.

I

Case No.
12388

1

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Prudential Insurance Company of America

STATEl\IENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Plaintiff is the beneficiary on policy numbered
D-47-308-070 in the face amount of $2,000.00 with a
$10,000.00 term rider, issued by the Prudential Insurance Company of America (hereinafter "Prudential")
to Douglas Ridd, who made application therefor on July
13, 1967. The policy was issued by Prudential under the
date of application but was not delivered before Ridd
died while vacationing at Bear Lake, nine days later.
1

Prudential refuses to pay under the policy on the ground
that the application, as learned after Ridd's death, contains material errors, misrepresentations, and nondisclosures with reference to Ridd's health which, had the
true facts been known, would have prevented Prudential
from issuing the policy. At the time of application, Ridd
had experienced, for a number of years, a neurological
abnormality known as cataplexy, the symptoms of
which, characterized as an "attack," are a sudden and
marked loss of muscle tone upon strong emotional stimulation, usually laughter or fear. For the sole reason of
these attacks, Ridd had consulted Dr. 'Varren M.
Hughes in 1964 and Dr. Robert E. Jones on May 8,
1967, two months prior to making application for the
policy in question. Dr. Jones told Ridd he had cataplexy
which is incurable.
Plaintiff contends Ridd died of a coronary attack.
Prudential contends that the cause of death was unproved and in any event, is immaterial to the issues at
bar.
DISPOSITION OF THE LO,VER COURT
Upon the first trial of the case, the jury was unable
to reach a verdict. At the second trial, judgment was
entered by the court upon a jury verdict in favor of
plaintiff in the amount of $12,000. Defendant's timely
motions for a directed verdict, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial, were denied.
Plaintiff's motion to amend the judgment to include
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interest at 6% from September 1, 1967 to December 1,
1970 was granted and the judgment was accordingly
amended to the sum of $14,506.67.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Prudential seeks reversal of the judgment of the
District Court, the entry of judgment in its favor, no
cause of action, and in the alternative a new trial.

STA'l'El\IENT

0}_,

FACTS

On July 13, 1967, August L. Jung, a medical doctor employed by Prudential to make insurance examinations, appeared by appointment at Ridd's residence
where guests were being entertained. Dr. Jung, using
Prudential's examination forms which are a part of the
application and have become a part of the policy itself,
took a medical history of Ridd and afterward gave him
a physical examination. (R-390, 400. Exs. 4-D) As to
the history, Dr. Jung orally asked the following questions contained on Part 2 of the application form and
marked Ridd' s answers to the questions in the appropriate spaces provided on the form: (R-395-399)
5. Have you ever been treated by any physician

or other practitioner for or had any known indication of:

b) nervous or mental disorder, paralysis, or

severe or frequent headaches?
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c) epilepsy, convulsiom, dizzy
of consciousness ?

or loss

6. Have you ever been treated by any physician

or other practitioner for or had any known
indication of any disease or disorder of any
of the following not discussed in the answers
to Question 5:
c) Brain or nervous system?

9. Other than as disclosed in the answers to
Questions 5 through 8, have you, within the
past 5 years, ever consulted or been attended
by or been examined or had a checkup by any
physician or other practitioner?
10. Do you have any known indication of any
physical disorder, deformity, defect or abnormality not disclosed in the answers to Questions 5 through 9 ?
14. What are the full particulars with respect to
each and every part of Questions 4 through
13 to which the answer is "Yes"?
(Ex. 4-d)
Ridd answered all of the above questions in the negative
with the exception of number 9 to which his answer was
affirmative. ( R-39.5-399) In answer to question 14,
Ridd elaborated on his affirmative answer to question 9
by stating that he had been given a physical examination
by Robert E. Jones, 1\1.D., who found him to be in good
health. ( R-399) This fact was noted by Dr. Jung in the
space provided for question 14 by the words "P.E.-good
health" followed by the name and address of Dr. Jones.
(R-399) At the bottom of the form immediately above
the signature line is the following printed statement:
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I hereby declare that all of the statements and
answers to the above questions are complete and
true and include full particulars of each and
every part of Questions 4 through 13 to which the
answer is "Yes." I agree that the foregoing together with this declaration shall form a part,
designated as Part 2, of the application for insurance. (Ex. 4-D)
Ridd signed the form and Dr. Jung signed the same
form as a witness. Dr. Jung put on the application all
health information given by Ridd. ( R-402) He asked
each question as written and recorded each answer
thereto as given by Ridd. ( R-395-402) Ridd did not
mention the word "cataplexy" to Dr. Jung and did not
give the name of Dr. Hughes whom he had seen in 1964.
(R-399-400) Ridd also stated, in response to question
number 14, that an appendectomy had been performed
in 1944 by Dr. Morton. ( R-400, ex. 4-D)
Had Ridd answered any of the questions on the application with reference to medical disorders positively
instead of negatively, Dr. Jung would have made further inquiry and noted the answers given. (R-402) If
Ridd had stated that Dr. Jones had recently diagnosed
cataplexy, Dr. Jung "would have asked what the symptom complex was that led to this dianosis, the frequency
of the attacks, the nature of the attacks, and whether or
not the man had been receiving any treatment for this,
or taking any medications-a general idea of what these
attacks consisted of and, you know, how often they occurred." ( R-404) Dr. Jung did not define any of the
terms in the questions since he assumed they were self
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explanatory. ( R-410) Ridd did not ask Dr. Jung to define any term read to him, had no apparent problem
hearing or understanding the questions, and was apparently of normal intelligence. (R-415) Had Ridd
asked Dr. Jung to define any terms, he would and could
have done so. (R-415) Dr. Jung was familiar with cataplexy, although it is not commonly seen. (R-413) Cataplexy, according to Dr. Jung, "may be progressive in
that the frequency of the attacks may become greater."
(R-413) He also testified that "Cataplexy is the kind of
disease and the kind of condition that, under appropriate circumstances, well could contribute to a man's death .
. . . If a man were working on a scaffold and fell with a
cataplectic attack, that could be fatal." (R-412, 413)
Because the application as signed and submitted,
contained a negative history, it was not referred by the
Prudential Underwriting Department to the Medical
Department for evaluation and was not the subject of
further inquiry. (R-434) Dr. Albert H. Domm, medical
director of Prudential testified:
Our usual procedure is, if the questions are answered in the negative, we feel this is a rather detailed questionnaire and, if the references to consultations to doctors indicate normal findings, or
good health, there is nothing in a report such as
this to prompt the Underwriting Department to
verify these things, and under these circumstances, no attempt is made to obtain records or
reports from the doctors so listed. (R-435-436)
After Ridd' s death, Prudential, according to its
standard procedure, addressed inquiries on its attend6

ing physician's form to Dr.Jones and Dr. llughes. (R427)
On _May 8, 1967, barely more than two months prior
to giving the aforesaid medical history to Dr. Jung,
Ridd had consulted Robert E. Jones, lH.D., with the
isolated complaint of recurring episodes of marked weakness associated with emotional stimulation, especially
with laughter but sometimes with anger. (R-337) Ridd
reported that he never lost consciousness nor memory
during the episodes and that he was normally able to get
to a chair but that on occasion he had fallen and that the
attacks had occurred over the past six to seven years and
perhaps longer. The attacks were of short duration,
"perhaps a few moments to a minute or so." (R-340)
Their frequency, according to Dr. Jones, was "variable,
depending on how of ten he received the rather marked
stimulation that it took to evoke an attack. In other
words, he 'vas not likely, apparently, to develop an attack in a situation with mild laughter, but if something
really tickled him, something that evoked a fair amount
of laughter, then he would suddenly develop the generalized muscular weakness." (R-340) From the history given by Ridd, Dr. Jones felt that it was a clear cut
case of cataplex, and told Ridd so. (R-341) Then Dr.
Jones discussed cataplexy with Ridd:
'Ve discussed what cataplexy was, what he could
anticipate-that usually there was no progression
of this process, that the avoidance of external
stimulation would be helpful to him if this was
possible for him to do and that, given an instance
when something of this nature might occur, if he
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could attempt to sit down or lie down, he would
be less likely, of course, to fall and injure himself. He had on occasion, I believe, fallen-yes,
I have a note here. It says: "Usually able to get
to chair," et cetera, "but on occasion has fallen."
( R-341-342)

Jones was also concerned about Ridd's having an attack
while driving an automobile:
Q. \Vhat effect does cataplexy have on life expectancy?

A. Barring an accident of some sort, such as having an attack while driving an automobile and
smashing up the car or something of that
sort, it should have no effect of shortening
the expected life span.
Q. Did he give you any history of having this
while he drove an automobile?

A. No, and we did talk about this. He stated that
ordinarily-well, he stated specifically that
he had no problem from this standpoint when
he was doing such things as driving an automobile. I can't tell you why. He just hadn't.
(R-342)

* * * * *

A. Well, my concern in this, obviously was that I
felt if he did have episodes of cataplexy while
driving an automobile, he shouldn't drive, but
usually his attacks seemed to come primarily
with laughter-this was the primary thing
that he gave me in his history--occasionally
with anger, occasionally with other emotional
stimuli; but I felt that not too many of us
burst into laughter driving these days and he
didn't seem to get these attacks while driving
from a car darting in front of him or some8

thing of this nature. He said this did not seem
to evoke the attack. The point I am trying to
make is that his attacks occurred primarily
with laughter. This seemed to be the thing
that triggered off his syndrome which we
know is cataplexy. (R-344-345)

* * * * *

Q. Did you have any discussion as to how he
should conduct his activities or his work with
his condition?
A. We discussed, as he knew, the avoidance of
the emotional stimulation, which is obviousiy
an impossibility. It is like telling somebody,
"do not catch cold." It's a good idea, but how
do you do it? This situation was one that there
really is unsatisfactory treatment for in reality. 'Ve gave him one of the representative
groups of drugswhich sometimes will help and
there is, to my knowledge, nothing else to do
for this individual or any individual with
cataplexy. (R-354)
Dr. Jones prescribed Ritalin, a benzedrine-type drug,
which is a central nervous system stimulant. (R-351)
One taking it is aware of its effect. (R-352) Ridd had
related that the drug made him quite nervous and too
keyed up. (R-291) During the examination by Dr.
Jones, Ridd appeared to understand the questions put
to him, seemed intelligent, and had no trouble relating
the symptoms. (R-352) He mentioned to Dr. Jones his
1964 visit to Dr. Huges. (R-352) Dr. Jones told Ridd
that there was no cure for cataplexy but that the use of
stimulating drugs might help reduce the frequency of
attacks. ( R-344)
9

Dr. Jones was familiar with a .Mayo Clinic report
on the narcoleptic syndrome, of which cataplexy forms
a part ( R-348) Of the several hundred patients studied,
68% had cataplexy, but all had narcolepsy. (R-348)
From what Dr. Jones could find out, the majority of
persons suffering from cataplexy, also have narcolepsy
which is an irresistable urge to sleep. (R-348-437) If
one had a trait of dropping off to sleep easily, it might
be of some significance with reference to the narcoleptic
syndrome and invite further inquiry. ( R-347) Ridd had
such a trait but did not give a history of it to any doctor.
( R-340) Dr. Jones explained that although distinct
from epileptic attacks, cataplectic attacks also come
without warning in that one having cataplexy is confronted with a particular emotional stimulation which
might or might not cause an attack, neither the occurrence nor severity of which can be predicted. ( R-349)
Although there was no loss of consciousness, Ridd sustained general muscle weakness and immobility so that
during an attack he was no more able to respond to a situation than if he were unconscious. (R-349) As compared to a petit mal epileptic seizure, a cataplectic attack is more grave. (R-343, 351) The cause of the one
is no more known that of the other. (R-350-351)
In 1964, Ridd consulted Warren H. Hughes, a
specialist of internal medicine with apparent reference
to the same symptoms for which he consulted Dr.Jones.
Ridd, at that time gave a history of:
Dizziness and partial loss of consciousness with
vigorous laughing or anger episodes. Has fallen
10

on a number of occasions when he has been in an
upright position. The duration of the episodes,
five years. Frequency has been somewhat variable
according to the circumstances. Has never occurred with any other types of exertion, other
than anger and laughing. (R-326)
Dr. Hughes, believing that Ridd's symptoms were the
result of hyperventilation, did not diagnose cataplexy.
(R-328) Ridd, however, did not report his trait of falling asleep, which would have warranted further inquiry.
(R-327) According to Dr. Hughes, cataplexy appears
in three-fourths of the cases that manifest narcolepsy.
(R-328) This means that where cataplexy appears, narcolepsy is statistically always present. Both are recognized neurological abnormalities. (R-330-331) N arcolepsy and cataplexy are considered clinical symptoms to
abnormal brain function and in some cases do occur with
other definite organic brain disorders. ( R-329) Granting the difference between epileptic and catalectic attacks, the epileptic' s loss of consciousness would, in its
effect, be similar to the cataplectic's inability to move his
muscles. (R-332) Hughes advised Ridd to prevent situations where the types of emotional stimulation triggering his attacks might occur which, admittedly, is impossible. (R-319, 333)
Ridd' s application containing the medical history
elicited by Dr. Jung as it stands, would not have come
to the :Medical Department of Prudential, but the Underwriting Department, as it did with Ridd's application,
would normally have issued a policy on it without inquiry of any doctors listed thereon, since the application
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indicates on its face, normal findings or good health. ( R434) If, however, an application submitted in 1967 had
contained positive answers to questions 5 ( b), 5 ( c), 9
or 10 and given the explanation "cataplexy," ...
. . . [it} would have been ref erred to the Medical Department because the diagnosis of
cataplexy on there is a rather unusual one
and one which is unfamiliar to our people in
the Underwriting Department and it would
have been sent to us for interpretation and
evaluation.
Q. In making this interpretation and evaluation,
what procedure and practice would the Medical Department have followed in July of
1967?

* * * * *

A. Our approach to this would then have been
to ask for a medical report for Dr. Robert
Jones.
Q. Now, assume a little further, if you will, that
if such an inquiry had been made and a reply
had been received from Dr.Jones which stated:
"A thirty-six year old white male with an
isolated complaint of recurring episodes of
marked weakness, associated with emotional
[stimulation}, especially while laughing and
sometimes with anger, never loses consciousness-no loss of memory from episodes, no suggestion of convulsive disorder
per se, usually able to get to chair but on
occasion has fallen, attacks have occurred
over the past six-seven years, perhaps
I onger ... "
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and reported that the [applicant] had seen a
Dr. 'Varren Hughes in 1964, at an address in
Salt Lake City, what would have been on
such an inquiry the usual practice and procedure of the Medical Department thereafter
in 1967?

* * * * *

A. 'Ve would have proceeded then to get a report from the office of Dr. Hughes.

Q. \Vould you have proceeded by way of mail?
A. Yes.
Q. That is a written inquiry mailed to the doctor?

A. Yes. We have a standard attending physician statement form which is rather uniformly used by most companies and mailed to the
doctor. He has a choice of replying on our
form or in the form of a narrative report on
his letterhead.
Q. Assume further that, in connection with this
application which we have discussed and and
inquiry of Dr. Jones, that such an inquiry on
the form you described were submitted to Dr.
Hughes and assume further that the reply
was received from Dr. Hughes which stated
as follows:

"This patient was examined on February

8, 1964 at which time a complete history

and physical examination was accomplished. The symptoms at that time were
dizziness and partial loss of consciousness
with vigorous laughing or severe anger
episodes. He had fallen on a number of occasions when he was in an upright position.
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The duration of this has been for the past
four or five years prior to the examination.
The frequency has been somewhat variable,
according to circumstances.
There were no symptoms suggestive of hyperventilation to precede the apparent loss
of consciousness.
Clinical impression: Episodes of near syncope, most probably on the basis of the effects of hyperventilation." (R-441-444)
Based upon the truthful hypothetical application, inquiries and replies thereto, Prudential would not have
issued the policy. (R-445, 446) The basis for the decision
would have been that cataplexy presents an increased
risk factor from both a medical and underwriting point
of view which disqualifies the applicant. Dr. Domm
stated:
A. A history of cataplexy is of considerable interest to us when it appears in an applicant
for life insurance because, although it has no
direct bearing on one's longevity, it, however,
does place an individual so affected in situations which may well jeopardize his health and
his life. ( R-437)

* * * * *

Q. You say there was some increased risk with
this matter of cataplexy. In what situation
would there be such an increased risk?

A. The situations, for example, of driving an
automobile, walking up or down a step, a
flight of stairs, even taking a bath in a bathtub, an individual suddenly afflicted with uncontrolled ability to move a muscle, walking
1-f

along the street "\ntiting for a bus in some situation if an emotion arises, it could result in
loss of muscle tone; all of these things woul<l
place an individual in considerable Jeopardy
and increase the risk of an accident. ( R-438)
On July 12, 1967, the day before Ridd was examined by Dr. Jung, Prudential's agent Edward L.
Foster asked Ridd the following questions in connection
with the reinstatement of a separate family policy. (R376, 377).
Q. 13 - I-las the insured, or any person listed in
Questions 10 or 11 and now living, ever been
treated by any physician or other practitioner
for or had any known indication of:
( c) paralysis, epilepsy, or a nervous or men-

tal disorder?

(k) any other physical disorder or deformity
or defect not already mentioned? (Ex.
5-D)

To each question a nagative answer was given by Ridd
and marked by }_,oster. (R-377, 378) Foster also asked
question 16 which is as follows:
Q. Other than as disclosed in the answers to
Questions 13 through 15 has the Insured, or
any person listed in Questions 10 or 11 and
now living, within the past 5 years, ever consulted or been attended by or been examined
or had a check-up by any physician or other
practitioner?
Ridd gave a positive answer and in the space provided in
paragraph 17 for the explanation of positive answers
given in paragraph 16, Foster wrote: "He had a physi-
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cal (Doug)
8, 1967 to check his general health by
Dr. Robert Jones, Salt Lake City, Utah." No further
information regarding the physical was given to Foster
by Ridd. ( R-379)
Although Ridd went to both Dr. Jones and Dr.
Hughes for the specific problem of cataplectic attacks,
the information contained on both applications refers
only to an apparently routine examination performed by
Dr. Jones, who found Ridd in good health. (Ex. 4-D,
5-D) No mention is made of Dr. Hughes. No mention is
made of the sole reason Ridd was examined by Dr.
Jones. No mention is made of Dr. Jones' diagnosis of
cataplexy. No symptoms are stated.

POINT I
THE JUDGMENT APPEALED
IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE THE INSURANCE
POLICY BY ITS TERMS NEVER TOOK EFFECT
The general provisions of the contract provide as
follows:
This policy is issued in consideration of the application herefor and of the payment of premiums
as provided herein. The policy, together with the
application, a copy of which is attached hereto
and made a part hereof at issue, constitute the
entire contract (Ex. 1-P)
At the bottom of Part I of the application, it is provided:
16

The undersigned agree ( s) : ( 1) that parts 1 and

2 of the application, any amendment thereto, and

any Supplementary Declaration thereto shall become a part of the policy hereby applied for;
... [N]o insurance shall take effect unless: (a)
a policy is issued by the company and accepted
by the proposed insured and by the applicant if
other than the groposed insured and the full first
premium is paid, all during the proposed insured' s
life time, and (b) all of the answers to the questions in part 1 and rt of the application continue
to be true and complete answers as of the date of
acceptance of the policy, in which case the insurance under the policy, in accordance with and subject to the terms and conditions of the policy, shall
be deemed to have taken effect as of the policy
date stated in the policy or an earlier date if so
specified in the policy. (emphasis added) (Ex.
4-D)
'l'he language on the application, quoted above, is in
compliance with §31-19-11 (e) UCA 1953 requiring that
the time at which insurance takes effect be stated in the
contract. Variations and modifications of the policy
terms are invalid unless plainly expressed therein in
writing. §§31-19-18, 31-19-26 UCA 1953.
The policy under which plaintiff claims did not
take effect for two reasons:
1. It was not accepted by the insured during his

lifetime.

2. The answers to part 2 of the application were

not true on the date of acceptance of the policy
by the insured.
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1. An application is only an offer for insurance. Acceptance of the policy by the insured is as vital an aspect of
an insurance contract as acceptance by the insurer. I
Appleman, Insurance Law
Practice, §171 p. 271.
Where a policy provides that the insurance is not effective until the policy is accepted by the insured, acceptance is a condition precedent to validity of the contract, 12 Appleman, Insurance Law Practice, §7151.
The policy at bar was neither delivered to nor accepted
by Ridd because he died 9 days after making application,
and just prior to its being delivered. ( R-278, 288)
Where an applicant dies before delivery and acceptance
of a policy, the contract is not complete. Provident S avings Life Assur. Soc. v. Elliott's Ex's., 93 SW 659 (Ky
1906) at p. 662. Accordingly, there can be no recovery
thereunder.
2. The questions contained in Part 2 of the application
which were read to Ridd by Dr. Jung, are broadly
drafted in laymen's terms. They seek for "any known
indication" of various disorders touching on or indicative
of almost every conceivable malady. Question number
10 asks if the applicant has "any known indication of any
physical disorder, deformity, defect or abnormality" not
already disclosed. Question number 14 asks for "the full
particulars" with regard to each and every "yes" answer to questions 4 through 13. Ridd certified on the application that his "yes" answers were "complete and true
and include full particulars of each and every part" of
the questions to which a "yes" answer was given. The
answers given, however, were clearly not "true and com-
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plete answers as of the date of acceptance of the policy."
\Vhere a life policy is expressly conditioned upon true
answers, untrue answers void the policy regardless of
their materiality. T¥illiamson v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., 180 P.607 (Cal 1919) at p. 610; Boyer v.
United States
Guaranty Company, 274 P.57
(Cal 1929) at pp. 60-61; Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v.
Ward, 42 SE2d 713 ('V. Va. 1947). Not only were the
answers given by Ridd not true and complete, but the
date to which they must have remained so never arrived,
Ridd having died before his acceptance of the policy.

POINT II
TI-IE
APPEALED
IS ERRONEOUS BECAUSE SECTION 31-19-8, UCA
IU53, BARS PLAINTIFF'S RECOVERY
Section 31-19-8 UCA states:
31-19-8. Representations in applications - ( 1)
All statements and descriptions in any application for an insurance policy or annuity contract
or for the reinstatement or renewal thereof, by or
in behalf of the insured or annuitant, shall be
deemed to be representations and not warranties.
_Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of
facts, and incorrect statements, shall not prevent
a recovery under the policy or contract unless:
(a) fraudulent; or
(b) material either to the acceptance of the
risk, or to the hazard assumed by the insurer; or
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( c) the insurer in good faith either would not
have issued the policy or contract, or would
not have issued, reinstated or renewed it
at the same premium rate, or would not
have issued, reinstated, or renewed a policy or contract in as large an amount, or
would not have provided coverage with
respect to the hazard resulting in the loss,
if the true facts had been made known to
the insurer as required either by the application for the policy or contract or
otherwise.
(2) If, in any action to rescind any policy or contract or to recover thereon, any
misrepresentation with respect to a medical impairment is proved by the insurer,
and the insured or any other person having or claiming a right under the contract
shall prevent full disclosure and proof of
the nature of the medical impairment, the
misrepresentation shall be presumed to
have been material.

Under the statute, any misrepresentation, omission, concealment of fact or incorrect statement may prevent recovery under the policy if the same is fraudulent OR
material to the acceptance of the risk OR if the insurer
would not have issued the policy if the true facts had
been made known to the insurer as required by the application.
Although the statute is clear on its face, the trial
court read the fraud requirement into all aspects of the
statute and, over defendant's objection, so instructed the
jury. (Instrudion No. 13 R-240, 467, 468) The court
20

instructed the jury that a misrepresentation is a statement which is untrue and the insured knows is untrue
and which has a tendency to mislead and which is material to the risk, ( R-240) ; that an "omission is an intentional failure to disclose a fact or condition which is
material to the acceptance of the risk assumed," (R; that a concealment of facts implies an intentional
withholding of the facts of which one has knowledge,
( R-240) ; that an incorrect statement is one known to be
untrue or made so carelessly that an intent to mislead
may be inferred. (R-240, 241). These words are not defined in the statute. They are words of common usage,
not terms of art, and presumably the legislature did not
believe that they warranted definition. Not being defined by law, their construction if not clear as a matter
of law, should have been freely left to the jury. If a misrepresentation, omission, concealment, or incorrect statement is knowingly made, with intent to deceive (which
is presumably the only reason why such would be knowingly made) or if otherwise fraudulent, the statute prevents recovery. However, it also prevents recovery if the
misrepresentation, omission, concealment or incorrect
statement was material to the risk or if no policy would
have been issued in good faith if the true facts were
known. Therefore, the statute on its face denies recovery
if a misrepresentation or omission or concealment of
facts or incorrect statement is innocently made as long as
it is material to the risk or if there would have been a
good faith refusal to issue the policy if the true facts
required by the application were known. Although "mis-
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representation" and "concealment" may, although not
necessarily, infer sinister intent, "omission" and "incorrect statement" clearly do not and no authority was presented to the trial court to warrant its glossing those
terms with the requirement of "knowingness" or "carelessness," to the prejudice of the defendant. The scheme
of the statute and the case law are clearly to the contrary. Plaintiff has emphasized the importance of Ridd's
subjective intent about his representation. But the applicant's intent about any omission or incorrect statement
is immaterial under the statute for the reason that it is
the insurer's prerogative to select among the risks it insures. (Instruction number 12 R.239) To condition the
exercise of that prerogative upon the applicant's degree
of sincerity in giving a medical history, renders it illusory
and puts the insurer at a decided disadvantage before a
jury. From the state of the evidence before this court,
however, reasonable minds could not differ, that at the
vel'y least, there were omissions from and incorrect statements on Ridd's application with reference to any known
indication of cataplexy. The only questions remaining
under the statute are:
I. Whether the omissions or incorrect statements

were material to the acceptance of the risk, or

2. Whether Prudential would not in good faith,
have issued the policy if the true facts were
known, as required by the application, or
3. Whether the omissions or incorrect statements
were fraudulent.
An affirmatiYe answer to any of these questions is suffi-
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cient to defeat recovery. Prudential contends that all
three are affirmatively answered by uncontroverted evidence.
A. RIDD'S OMISSIONS AND INCORRECT
STATElHENTS, HOWEVER INNOCENT,
\VERE MATERIAL TO PRUDENTIAL'S
ACCEPTANCE OF THE RISK, :MAKING
THE POLICY VOID.
Doctors Hughes, Jones, Jung and Domm were
unanimous that the cataplectic attacks would or did
render Ridd helpless for a period of time and that the
attacks could not be eliminated because one cannot prevent or predict the occurrance or degree of the emotional stimulation which triggers them. (R-319, 326,
331-333, 342, 344-345, 354, 412-413, 437, 438). All four
doctors cited circumstances under which an attack
would jeopardize the patient and increase the risk of
injury or fatality. (R-312, 342, 412, 437, 438) Dr. Jones
was particularly concerned with whether Ridd could
safely drive an automobile and discussed the matter with
him at some length. (R-342, 344, 345) Solely on the
basis of Ridd's prior history, Dr. Jones did not restrict
his driving. ( R-344)
The cause of Ridd's death, although a mystery, is
neither material nor relevant to the controversy. It is
conceivable that a cataplectic attack while water skiing
might, in the stress of fear, induce a heart attack. Otherwise, there is no history of heart trouble in the decedent,
who was young, strong and athletic. The symptoms ob-
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served by plaintiff prior to death were equally indicative
of other serious ailments. ( R-422) No autopsy was performed, and the attending doctor could not have been
with Ridd prior to death. Plaintiff testified that after
his family had eaten dinner, Ridd ate; that he finished
water skiing at 7 :00 p.m. and did not die until 11 :00
p.m. in the hospital at .Montpelier, 20 miles away. (R293, 298) The death certificate, however, gives the time
of death at 7 :00 p.m. meaning that Ridd must have been
dead on arrival at Montpelier. (Ex. 2-P, R-423) It also
describes the interval between onset and death as sudden. (Ex. 2-P) (R-423) On the state of the record,
there was no evidence from which the jury could determine the cause of death. It was prejudicial error for the
court to receive the death certificate and to admit testimany regarding Ridd' s death, all over strenuous obj ection by defendant on the grounds of prejudice and
immateriality. (R-294, 295) It was also reversable error,
once evidence on the cause of death was admitted, to refuse to give defendant's instruction number 14 to which
refusal defendant excepted. (R-224, 467) Defendant's
Instruction 14 is that it makes no difference that the insured' s death is covered by a condition other than that
misrepresented or concealed on an insurance application
form. Again, the reason is that the insurer has a right to
select its risks, regardless of the cause of an intervening
death.
The vice of the misrepresentations made by decedent would still be seriously grave, in appellant's quest for payment, even though decedent
had perished in a storm at sea. Robinson vs. Oc-
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cidental Life Insurance Company, 281 P.2d 39
(Cal 1955)
Appellant's final contention is that in any event
the false statements and concealments were immaterial. The deceased died of cancer of the lung.
The attending physician at the time of death testified that he did not find anything that would indicate that the deceased had heart trouble. Appellant argues that since the deceased did not
have heart disease, the false answers did not go to
the materiality of the risk. It is not necessary that
the misrepresentation have any causal connection
with the death of the insured .... The question is
whether the misrepresentation is such that if the
insurer had known the true facts it would have
made further inquiries or would have been influenced materially in its decision in accepting
the risk. There was testimony that if the insurer
had known a heart condition was suspected it
would not have issued the policy. Under such circumstances we cannot say that the false answers
were immaterial. Torbensen v. Familv Life Ins.
Company, 329 P.2d 596 (Cal 1958)

1

The court in Campbell v. Prudential Insurance
Company of America, 155 NE2d 9 (Ill 1959) on a
statute similar to §31-19-8, affirmed the appellate court's
reversal of the trial court's decision in favor of the beneficiary of a life policy.
In our opinion the Appellate Court correctly held
that a verdict should have been directed for the
defendant. The testimony of defendant's expert
witness relating to the materiality of the misrepresentations to the acceptance of the risk, was undisputed. That the insured did not die from the
affliction with respect to which information was
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withheld does not affect the materiality of the
misrepresentations .... Nor is it significant that
none of the doctors testified to a positive diagnosis of a recurrent peptic ulcer. The point is that
the insured, by withholding relevant information,
prevented the insurer from appraising the risk
on the basis of the facts as they existed.
Because evidence on the cause of death was admitted,
the jury apparently believed that since Ridd died of a
heart attack, any omission from or incorrect statement
on the application about cataplexy was not material and
should not therefore defeat recovery. Such a view, while
having a certain appeal to the jury, is contrary to law.
Plaintiff contends that the applicant's omissions or
incorrect statements were immaterial if he acted in good
faith. The statute, on the other hand, permits an omission or incorrect statement to defeat recovery if material
to acceptance of the risk, regardless of the applicant's
good faith as to the error.

In Prudential Insurance Company vs. Ashe, 254

NW 243 (Mich. 1943) the applicant for reinstatement
represented that he was in good health ·when in fact he
had been treated for pleurisy, fistula and lumbago. The
court found that the applicant had fraudulently violated
his duty of disclosure and in addition, on the basis of a
statute similar to
that:
[a]n insurance policy may be cancelled for an untrue statement made in good faith or even in ignorance of its falsity, if such misrepresentation
materially affected the assumption of risk by the
msurer.
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Jessen v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 209 F.2d
453 (7th Cir. 1954) construed a statute similar to §3119-8 in sustaining the trial court's direction of a ver<lic:t
in favor of the insurer on the ground that an intent to
deceive was not required for avoidance of the policy.
The decisive issue thus presented is whether there
is any evidence in the record, which, when [construed most favorably] to defendant, constitutes
proof of materiality of any of the negative answers made by Weinstein.... Misrepresentations
will avoid a policy of life insurance if they are,
in fact, false and material to the risk even though
the applicant acted through mistake or in good
faith.

* * * * *

We shall not burden the insurer with the necessity of proving actual fraud as a condition for relief on a policy procured through undisputed material misprepresentations of fact made by the
insured.

Continental Casualty Company v. Mulligan, 460
P .2d 27 (Ariz. 1969) concerned a statute identical to
§31-19-8. The court reversed the trial court's ruling in
favor of the insured:
The essence of plaintiff's testimony as to why he
did not disclose this medical advice and treatment
received from the heart specialist, Dr. Bullington, was that he didn't think it was importantthat he didn't think he had an ailment that he
was being treated for.

* * * * *

'Ve find that plaintiff's claimed interpretation of
the word "ailment" as not reasonable, and that
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the matters here involved were not such minor
ailments or indispositions as would excuse nondisclosure by plamtiff. Under the circumstances,
this nondisclosure constituted legal fraud, even
though there is no direct evidence that plaintiff
intended to deceive the insurer.
In Mancias v. National
HealDh Insurance Company, 2 A2d 310 (NH 1938) the applicant
"had no intention to deceive the defendant by his answer
to the fourteenth question in his application, but assumed
that this question referred to some incurable disease."
On a statute similar in its pertinent parts to §31-19-8,
( 1) (b), the court denied recovery. In New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Flech, 12 NW2d 530 (ND 1944) the
beneficiary contended that the answers on the applica- i
tion "were all made in good faith and that [the decedent} .
believed the same to be true," that he had no knowledge
of the diseases as to which misprepresentations were
allegedly made and that his representations were true to
the best of his knowledge, information and belief. The
court ruled that the decedent "could not have forgotten
he had consulted Dr. Gumper," and that "Lt]he misrepresentation, whether understood thoroughly by insured or not, did in effect lull the plaintiff .... It was in
fact a false representation, but made in ignorance of his
true condition and therefore without actual intent to deceive but it materially affected reviver and continuance
of the risk." Accordingly, cancellation of the policy was
upheld.
In Delaney v. Prudential Insurance Company of
America, 13!) .N'V 2d 48 ('Vise 1966) a statute in its
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effect similar to that in Utah, was construed by the
court.
And, crucially, there was uncontradicted testimony by appellant's witnesses that these misrepresentations increased the risk. Without competing testimony to bring about a jury question, we
hold that such evidence increased the risk as a
matter of law, thus voiding the policy.
Accordingly, the requisite showing of Ridd's omissions and incorrect statements in answer to questions
5(b), 6(c), 9, 10 and U on the application having been
made and that they were material to Prudential's acceptance of the risk, Prudential was entitled to a directed verdict and is now entitled to Judgment on the basis
of §31-19-8, notwithstanding the beneficiary's assertion
that the omissions and incorrect statements were made
in good faith. Regardless of the unanimous medical
testimony before the court, the omissions and incorrect
statements were material as a matter of law since Ridd
was bound to know by the mere inquiry that Prudential
considered the disclosure of any medical abnormality or
disorder material to the risk.
It has been said that " ... even the most unsophisticated person must know that, in answering the
questionnaire and submitting it to the insurer, he
is furnishing the data on the basis of which the
company will decide whether, by issuing a policy
it wishes to insure him." Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Devore, 51 Cal. Rptr, 331
(1966) at p. 338.
The fact that defendant put the questions in writing and asked for written answers was itself
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proof that it deemed the answers material. Cohen
Company, 312
vs. Penn Mutual Life
P.2d, 241, (Cal 1957)
It certainly cannot be successfully contended that
they were not material, for they were made the
very basis of the contract. They were offered to
the defendant as a consideration for the policy.
Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 191 P.240
(Utah 1920)

In Dopson v. JYletropolitan Life Insurance Company, 426 S'V2d 410 (Ark. 1968), the insured sued for
specific performance of a group hospitalization rider.
The court found that in June, 1965, the applicant in response to the agent's questions had not revealed her hospitalization for a prior back problem in l\'Iay, 1964. Since ,
the insurance company would not have issued the policy
had it known the true facts, judgment was entered for
the insurer on the basis that the nondisclosure was material, under a statute almost identical to that in Utah.
In the case at bar, Ridd's false answers were clearly material to the risk to be accepted by the company.
B. IT IS UNCONTROYERTED THAT, HAD
THE TRUE FACTS OMITTED AND INCORRECTLY STATED, BEEN REVEALED
AS REQUIRED BY THE APPLICATION,
THE POLICY WOULD NOT I-IA VE BEEN
ISSUED.
An omission or incorrect statement may also defeat
recovery if "the insurer in good faith ...
not have
issued the policy . . . if the true facts had been made
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1

known to the insurer as required ... by the application
for the policy ... " §31-19-8 UCA 1953. The court instructed the jury, over defendant's exception, that
whether a policy would have been issued if true answers
had been given in the application cannot be left to the
determination of the insurer after the death of the insured and that the jury must decide what would have
led a reasonably prudent insurer to decline the application. (Instruction number 14, R-242) The instruction
is error. The test of materiality is a subjective test. The
statutory test is not what a reasonably prudent insurer
would have done but what in good faith the insurer at
bar would have done with an application containing the
true facts omitted from or incorrectly stated on the policy
under which claim is made. §31-19-S(c) UCA 1953. The
medical director of Prudential, Albert H. Domm, M.D.,
testified that had the true facts regarding cataplexy
been stated on the application and the reports of Doctors .Tones and Hughes been obtained, the policy would
not have been issued. ( R-445, 446) All four of the doctors testified that cataplexy increased the risk of accident
and fatality. Plaintiff introduced no evidence to question the uncontroverted testimony that Prudential, in
good faith, would not have issued the policy if the true
facts about Ridd's cataplexy had been known.
In an attempt to raise a jury question, respondent, relying on the testimony of Dr. Henske, her
physician, that since none of her condition was actuallv serious and since she was in good health in
1963: argues that the jury could have inferred
that the policy would have been issued even if all
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her hospitalizations were known. In the absence
of qualified testimony to the effect that persons
engaged in the same type of insurance business,
acting reasonably and naturally in accordance
with the practice usual in the insurance industry,
would have issued the policy even in the face of
these misrepresentations, there is no basis for
drawing any such inference and no jury
is presented. Delaney vs. Prudential Insurance
Company of America, supra.
The jury, as a matter of law, could not disregard Dr.
Domm' s testimony both because it was not controverted
and because it was not intrinsically improbable or unreasonable. The evidence, therefore, that Prudential in
good faith would not have issued the policy to Ridd had '
the true facts been known, is conclusive.
!

In Chesapeake
0. Ry. Co. vs. Martin, 283 US
209, 51 S Ct. 453 (1931), the United States Supreme
Court, in speaking through Justice Sutherland, said:
We recognize the general rule, of course, as
stated by both courts below, that the question of
the credibility of witnesses is one for the jury .
alone; but this does not mean that the jury is at
liberty, under the guise of passing upon the credibility of a witness, to disregard his testimony,
when from no reasonable point of view is it open
to doubt. The complete testimony of the agent in
this case appears in the record. A reading of it
discloses no lack of candor on his part. It was not
shaken bv cross-examination; indeed, upon this
was no cross-examination. I ts acpoint,
curacy was not controverted by proof or circumstance, <lireetly or inferentially; and it is difficult
to see why, if inaccurate, it readily could not have
!
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been shown to be so. The witness was not impeached; and there is nothing in the record which
reflects unfavorably upon his credibility. The
only possible ground for submitting the question
to the jury as one of fact was that the witness was
an employee of the petitioner. In the circumstances above detailed, we are of opinion that this
was not enough to take the question to the jury,
and that the court should have so held.
The same rule applies in Utah:
In this case the president of the bank, however,
disclosed all of the facts relating to the purchase
of the notes. All of his statements are reasonable
and inherently probable, and no one disputes or
questions them. Plaintiff's good faith in obtaining the notes, including the note in suit, is therefore
established without question or contradicth1. There is therefore no basis for the verdict and judgment, and hence they cannot be
permitted to stand. National Bank of the Republic v. Beckstead, 250 P. 1033, 68 U 421
( 1926) at p. 1044.
See also Dudley v. United States, 428 F.2d 1196
(9th Cir 1970) at p. 1201. To uphold the jury's verdict
under the aforesaid evidence as finding that Prudential
would have issued the policy anyway or that its refusal
to issue the policy would not have been in good faith,
would permit the jury to base its finding upon mere
speculation and conjecture. Kerren v. Bair, 225 P.1094,
63 u 344 ( 1924) .
It is well established that where a policy would not
have been issued had the true health facts been known,
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more is not required in order to defeat recovery. In
Tolar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 80
NE2d 53, (N.Y. 1948) the court reversed a jury verdict in favor of the beneficiary on the ground that the insurer had established the materiality of the misrepresentations on the application as a matter of law.
\Vhen we examine the uncontroverted proof that
the answers given concealed the fact of prior
medical consultation which led to a discovery of
the heart condition and that the practice of the
company was to reject nonmedical applications
containing such information, it inevitably follows
that the statutory definition of materiality is met
and no further proof is needed that the false answers constituted "a misrepresentation that the ·
applicant has not had the disease ... which was
discovered."
1

!

1

To the same effect is Continental Casualty Company v.
Mulligan, supra, involving a statute identical to that in
question:
The uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony
of defendant's chief underwriter ckarly showed
the established underwriting standards and practices of the defendant, and that under these established underwriting standards and practices, the
policies would not have been issued to an applicant for insurance who had shown a series of excessive blood pressure readings, as did plaintiff.
In view of this testimony, the materiality of
plaintiff's misrepresentations and nondisclosures
cannot seriously be questioned.
Accordingly, Ridd's omissions and incorrect statements, being established by conclusive and uncontradict-
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ed evidence, as both material to the risk and the basis of
a good faith refusal to issue the policy, prevent plaintiff's recovery under the statute.
C. RIDD'S
1'_,RAUD.

OMISSIONS AND INCORRECT
AMOUNT TO LEGAL

There can be no question but that Ridd's affirmative answers to questions 5 ( b) and ( c), 6 ( c) , and 10
were false. That they were also knowingly false must be
apparent by Ridd's answer to questions 9 and 14 regarding the physical examination given on May 8, 1967, by
Dr. Jones. By remembering Dr. Jones' examination,
Ridd had to have in mind all of the particulars of that
examination conducted a mere two months prior to Dr.
Jung's examination. Dr. Jones' examination was not
routine but conducted upon Ridd' s specific complaint of
episodic cataplectic attacks. The plaintiff's position is
that Ridd was assured that he was in good health and
did not believe that he had any ailment which would impair his longevity. The prerogative to determine its risks
belongs, however, to the insurance company rather than
to the applicant.
Nor does it matter what the deceased might personally have believed about his heart condition
and it's lack of substantial character. Defendant
did not ask on the application for meyely his evaluation of his physical condition, but also for a
truthful statement of his medical history. Cohen
vs. Penn Mutual Life Ins. Company, 312 P.2d
241 (Calif 1957)
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In Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 191 P.240, 5u

U 480 ( 1920), the deceased had been advised that he
had rheumatism when in fact, as an autopsy showed, he
was afflicted with tuberculosis of the spine.

While it is true that the deceased may not have
appreciated the nature of his disease, he, as the
undisputed evidence shows, did know that he was
seriously afflicted with some malady, and that he
had not only consulted doctors, but was being
treated by them therefor. The evidence thus
stands uncontradicted that the deceased did conceal material facts from the defendant, and it is
but fair, just, and right that the consequences of
such concealment should fall upon the beneficiaries of the insured rather than upon the def endant, and indirectly upon the policy holders.
Furthermore, Ridd cannot have thought that his cataplectic attacks were of no importance to the insurance
company in view of the number of questions touching on
his disorder to which he gave negative answers twice
within two days, both times remembering, however, to
list the physical examination by Dr.Jones. If Ridd were
in fact sure that his condition was healthy, he could have
stated Dr. Jones' findings along with his name. That he
did not do so compels the conclusion that he was fearful
that the information would prevent one policy from being reinstated and the other from being issued.
It is true that Dr. Jung did not ask Ridd specifically about cataplexy. But no information given by Ridd
would have prompted him to do so. Furthermore, the
questions on the application form were not written for
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physicians, but for laymen. They are drafted broadly in
order to extract all pertinent information. Even so, llidd
complained specifically of dizziness to Dr. Hughes in
1964. Dr. Hughes' name, however, does not appear on
the application form in response to question number 9
although he had been consulted within five years prior
to the application date and although Ridd had remembered to give his name to Dr. Jones two months earlier.
The applicant for insurance has a duty which a
reasonable man is bound to know. That duty is candor.
He cannot disregard that duty by usurping the prerogative of the company to determine what risks it will insure on the ground that the company is the party soliciting the policy and if it wants to know, it need only check
out the applicant's history by its own resources.
She [the plaintiff) further contends that her husband was not asked as to whether or not he had
high blood pressure, and points to the testimony
of both physicians that high blood pressure is not
a disease, and to the testimony of Dr. Walker
that on the last two calls the deceased made on
him ... his blood pressure was normal and that no
treatment was given or required for any physical
condition whatsoever.
It is evident that appellant does not understand
the nature of respondents' claims. The charges
against appellant are that her husband concealed
a serious vascular hypertention, a knowledge of
which would have required a rejection of his application for insurance .... The doctor testified
that he informed Mr. Robinson in understandable language of his true condition .... The representations made by decendent related to mat-
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ters material to the contract. Deceased knew of
his malady. His doctor had told him and he had
suffered. It was his duty to communicate in good
faith ail such facts. . . . Ile is bound to have
known that a high blood pressure was not popular with an insurance company. llut at the bme of
his examination, he denied he had either illness or
injuries during the precedmg three years; he answered that he was m good health and concealed
knowledge of his high blood pressure. In her zeal
to keep the inquiry directed to the subject of her
husband's heart trouble, appellant quotes both
doctors, Walker and Davis, that there was no
heart trouble as of August 8, 1951. Such was not
the issue, but rather it was: had her husband's
concealed knowledge of his vascular hypertension from the insurance companies ( They had a
right to know all he knew on that subject whereby
they might intelligently decide whether he was
an insurable risk .... It was not incumbent upon
respondents to investigate .Nlr. Robinson's statements made to the examiner. It was his duty to
divulge fully all he knew. No authority is cited
and none will be found holding that an insured or
his beneficiaries may escape the consequences of
his deception by placing upon the insurer the
burden of investigating his verified statement .
. . . For a candidate for life insurance to represent
his health to be good, when in truth it was bad, to
deny that he had consulted a physician within five
years on account of his vascular hypertension, although he had done so; to conceal his knowledge
of such vascular hypertension by saying only that
within five years he had gone to physician for a
"routine check-up" were material to the contract
for insurance and are fatal to recovery on the insurance policy .... An insurance company is entitled to determine for itself what risks it will
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accept, and therefore to know all the facts relative
to the applicant's physical condition. It has the
unquestioned right to select those whom it will
insure and to rely upon him who would be insured
for such information as it desires as a basis for its
determination to the end that a wise discrimination may be exercised in selecting its risks. Robinson v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 281 P.2d, 39,
(Calif 1955).
In the absence of such candor, the intent to deceive and
defraud the insurance company may be inferred "where
the applicant knowingly misrepresents facts which he
knows would influence the insurer in accepting or rejecting the risk." Theros v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Company, 407 P.2d 685, 17 U.2d 205 (1965). The trier
of fact should not be permitted to find an absence of
such intent where an applicant knowingly misrepresents
facts which he knows would influence the insurer in
accepting or rejecting the risk. New York Life Insurance Company v. Grow, 135 P.2d 120 (Utah 1943) at
p. 137.
Where an insured knowingly makes a material
misrepresentation, proof of an actual, conscious
purpose to deceive is not necessary." One cannot
knowingly conceal or misrepresent facts which
one knows would influence the risk or the issuance of the policy, and then be heard to say that
he did not intend to deceive or defraud. Zolintakis v. Equitable Assur. Soc., 108 F.2d 902
(10th Cir. 1940)
'Vhen, therefore, as here, it is made to appear
without question that the insured, in making his
application, knowingly concealed from the insurer his true condition of health, which was of
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such a serious nature that if it had been disclosed
his application would necessarily have been re'.
jected, the courts may not shut their eyes and
blindly accept the fmding of the jury. Chadwick
vs. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., supra, at p. 246)

POINT lII
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT DEFENDANT'S .MOTIONS .FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT AND FOR JUDGMENT
NOT,VITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
As before discussed, no jury question is presented
by any of the statutory or common law factors needed
by defendant to defeat recovery. The evidence is conclusive that regardless of Ridd' s intent, the application
is false in material respects for which reason Prudential
in good faith would not have issued the policy had the
true facts been known as required by the application.
Additionally, the omissions and incomplete statements
made by Ridd about material facts were fraudulent as
a matter of law. Ridd, by reference to Dr. Jones, had to
have in mind the purpose for his visit and the diagnosis
made. He could not remember Jones' name without remembering the purpose of the examination a mere two
months prior. The evidence in this case is substantially
without contradictin. Ridd had cataplexy; he knew he
had cataplexy; he knew the symptoms on the sole basis
of which the diagnosis was made; it was not revealed on
the application; knowledge of the cataplexy would have
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brought Prudential to make further inquiry of the facts
known to Doctors Jones and Hughes upon receipt of
which it would in good faith not have issued the policy;
the absence of any negative findings on Ridd's application caused the policy to have been issued by the Underwriting Department without referral to the Medical Department. Accordingly, Prudential's motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, should have been granted in its favor. (R-252,
462, 463).
POINT IV
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS
TO THE JURY ON THE LAW AND AFTER
THE VERDICT IN FAILING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
As already discussed, by failing to give defendant's
instruction number 14 relative to the immateriality of
the cause of Ridd' s death and by admitting evidence
relative thereto, a serious confusing and prejudicial element was permitted to go to the jury. The cases heretofore cited are representative of the body of unanimous
authority holding that the cause of death is not relevant
to the materiality of omissions or incorrect statements as
to a life insurance application. (R-242, 294, 298, 467,
Appellant's Brief p. 24).
The court's instruction number 12 correctly states
the law with reference to the applicant's duty of candor.
(R-239)
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In this case the application involved was signed
by the insured, Douglas G. Ridd, and he, as the
insured, and plaintiff, as the beneficiary, are
bound by the contents thereof, even though others
may have done the writing. ln such case an applicant for insurance must in good faith furnish
all information known to him which is inquired
about in connection with the filling out of such
application and he is bound to know that all such
questions set out on the application form are
deemed material by the company to its acceptance or rejection of the risk.
An insurance company is entitled to determine
for itself what risk it will accept and therefore to
know all the material facts relative to the applicant's physical condition. It has the right to select
those whom it will insure and to rely upon him
wh would be insured for such information as it
requires as a basis for its determination, subject
to the instructions hereinafter set forth.
As already noted, there is no possibility that Ridd remembered the physical examination by Dr. Jones but
innocently forgot why he went or what Dr.Jones found.
Even though he may perhaps have forgotten the term
"cataplexy" he had to know on July 13, 1967 that he had
a condition typified by sudden attacks of loss of muscle
tone rendering him helpless. Not to disclose that condition to Dr. Jung and Mr. Foster when asked numerous
and detailed questions about his health, was a clear
breach of the applicant's duty of candor. Accordingly,
and at the very least, defendant's instructions numbered
10 and 11, should have been given. (R-467, 221, 222)
Most appropriately, a verdict should have been directed
in favor of Prudential.
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Appellant has already noted the gloss of "knowingness" placed by the court on the terms "misprepresentations, omissions ,concealment of facts and incorrect statements" in instruction number 14. (R-240, Appellant's
Brief p. 20) The fact of Ridd' s knowingly doing each
and all of the foregoing should be apparent as a matter
of law. Even if not knowingly made in the case at bar,
plaintiff's recovery is barred by their having been made
or omitted at all, for whatever reason or lapse, since they
are material to the risk and the basis of a good faith refusal to issue the policy were the true facts known. (See
Appellant's Brief pp. 23, 30) The last two paragraphs of
Instruction 14, as previously noted, do not state the law
with reference to the insurer's standard of good faith.
Appellant's Brief p. 31) The insured's duty, as previously instructed by the court (number 12) is candor.
A representation that is substantially true and correct
does not meet that duty if it is not as complete as the
applicant could have made it. As a matter of law, the
answers given by Ridd to questions touching on his disorder were not substantially true and accurate. This is
to say nothing about the omissions, which were the real
problem. A substantially true and correct representation would have prompted further inquiry by Doctors
Jung and Domm. (R-404, 441-443) But an omission
coupled with the representation "PE-good health" not
only failed to arouse further inquiry but it in effect
created a positive impression upon the examining physician and underwriter that there was nothing of significance. (R-392, 434) This is particularly true because
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with cataplexy, there is an absence of any physical symptomatology except during an attack. (R-341, 350)
At the very least, defendant should be accorded a
new trial based upon the court's erroneous and prejudicial instructions to the jury as specified.

CONCLUSION
The question for decision is who, between the applicant and the insurer, shall decide upon acceptance of
a risk? Plaintiff's position is that if the applicant honestly believed he was in good health, then the insurer is
bound to its policy. Prudential claims that Ridd as a
matter of law, had to know that he had cataplexy but
that even if he innocently forgot or sincerely disregarded it as a health factor, the condition was material tu
acceptance of the risk and the policy would not have
been issued had the condition or its symptoms been
known. At the very least, further inquiry would have
been made and no policy would have been extant at the
time of death.
Although, under the evidence there is no jury question, the court created one by inverting the respective
rights and duties of the parties at bar. Under the law,
the applicant's duty is objective: to disclose all he knows
about his health, not all he thinks is pertinent to the risk.
The insurer is bound to its policy unless in good faith it
would not have issued the policy had the true facts required by the application been known, or unless the true
facts were material to acceptance of the risk or unless
4-1

the representations or omissions were fradulent. lly contrast, the court instructed that the applicant's subjective
intent determines the truth or falsity of the application
but that the good faith of the insurer in declining coverage on the basis of omissions from or incorrect statements on the application is held to the standard and practice of a reasonably prudent insurer. The confusion created by the court's instructions plus the prejudice engendered by its admitting evidence that the cause of
death was a heart attack, constitute prejudicial error.
The answer to the question at bar is clear: An insurer
"has the unquestioned right to select those whom it will
insure and to rely upon him who would be insured for
such information as it desires as a basis for its determination to the end that a wise determination may be
exercised in selecting its risks." Robinson v. Occidental
Life Insurance Company, supra. Having been deprived
of its right of wise selection because of omissions from
and incorrect statements on Ridd's application, Prudential is entitled to judgment.
Respectfully submitted,
THOMAS M. BURTON
VAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Attorneys for Defendant & Appellant
Prudential Insurance Company
of America
Suite 300, 141 East 1st South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

45

